NeoExistence Institute

Kevin Lay (Neo Israel)

10-14-25

Note: The author used AI-based language assistance during initial drafting. All revisions, concepts, and theoretical development were completed independently by the author.

Abstract

This article challenges the coherence of divine revelation by examining the necessity of hermeneutics and exegesis as interpretive mediators of scripture. If an omniscient and omnipotent deity intended scripture to function as clear, universal communication, the requirement for historical reconstruction, linguistic decoding, and theological arbitration is epistemically inconsistent with that premise. Drawing from cognitive science, philosophy of language, and epistemic lens theory, the paper argues that scriptural meaning is not transmitted but constructed through culturally conditioned cognition, schema-dependent interpretation, and confirmation bias. The fragmentation of doctrine, proliferation of denominations, and persistent interpretive disagreement further suggest that scripture operates like human-authored tradition rather than divine communication. Hermeneutics, rather than illuminating revelation, compensates for textual ambiguity and perceptual divergence. By reframing interpretive labor as evidence of anthropogenic origin, the paper contributes to interdisciplinary debates on religious epistemology, cognition, and the psychology of belief.

Preface

In a portable seminary, one of the authors argues in hermeneutics and exegesis, that you have to understand things like the culture, and the language that it was written in, as well as symbolism in the language they used, and the wording they used (Horton, 2006; Vanhoozer, 1998). They also argue in that book that there was revelation, inspiration, and God wanted humans to know his word (Horton, 2006). But if God wanted humans to know his word, why didn’t he, if he’s powerful enough to create all reality, and smart enough to create all reality, why didn’t he make all just one culture, one language, and not have cultures change over time? Hermeneutics and exegesis is too complicated. There’s so many misunderstandings, so many different ideas on different scriptural passages, so many arguments. It just seems like if a being was intelligent enough to create all of reality, powerful enough to create all of reality, wouldn’t the being have written, or communicated in some way that everybody would understand, and there wouldn’t be so much misunderstanding and arguments, and wrong conclusions about scripture.

Introduction

The Christian doctrine of revelation maintains that God intentionally communicated knowledge to humanity through inspired scripture (Grudem, 1994; Frame, 2013). The Portable Seminary and similar theological works assert that divine intent, combined with inspiration by the Holy Spirit, guarantees the reliability and accessibility of biblical texts (Horton, 2006). Yet, the widespread reliance on hermeneutics and exegesis to interpret scripture reveals a deeper epistemological problem: if the Bible is divinely inspired and meant to be understood by all people, why does it require specialized interpretive methods, historical reconstruction, linguistic decoding, and theological arbitration to determine its meaning? (Thiselton, 2009; Vanhoozer, 1998).

This paper argues that the complexity, ambiguity, and cultural dependency of scriptural interpretation undermine the claim that God intended His message to be universally understood. When evaluated through the lenses of cognitive science, philosophy of language, and epistemology, the features of biblical interpretation more closely resemble human textual transmission than divine communication. The necessity of interpretive mediation is not an accessory to revelation but evidence of its failure as a universal communicative act. Hermeneutics, instead of preserving revelation, exposes its fragility.

The argument proceeds by examining the internal theological claims made about revelation and contrasting them with the sociolinguistic and cognitive realities of scriptural interpretation. It evaluates the implications of interpretive pluralism, doctrinal fragmentation, and linguistic inaccessibility, then applies epistemic lens theory to explain why individuals perceive the same texts through divergent conceptual frameworks. The analysis culminates in the conclusion that revelation, as presented in Christian theology, fails its own stated objectives.

I. The Theological Claim: Revelation, Inspiration, and Divine Intent

Christian theology traditionally grounds scriptural authority in two key doctrines: revelation and inspiration. Revelation refers to God making His will known to humanity, while inspiration holds that the biblical authors were guided by the Holy Spirit in recording that revelation (Grudem, 1994; Frame, 2013). Texts such as 2 Timothy 3:16 (“All Scripture is God-breathed”) and 2 Peter 1:21 are often cited to support the argument that biblical communication is purposeful, accurate, and divinely safeguarded (Wright, 2018; Piper, 2013).

Authors in works like The Portable Seminary commonly assert that God intended scripture to communicate essential truths to all people across all cultures and times (Horton, 2006). This presumes three attributes of divine communicative intent:

1. Clarity – God would ensure the message is understandable.
2. Accuracy – The content would remain consistent over time.
3. Universality – The message would transcend culture, language, and historical context (Erickson, 2013; Packer, 1994).

However, this idealized model of revelation is difficult to reconcile with the observable characteristics of biblical interpretation. The proliferation of commentaries, denominational disputes, translation controversies, and contradictory doctrinal systems suggests that scripture does not function as a self-evident or universally accessible text (Ehrman, 2005; McGrath, 2017). The extensive reliance on interpretive fields such as hermeneutics and exegesis indicates that meaning is neither fixed nor inherently transparent (Thiselton, 2009; Vanhoozer, 1998).

If divine revelation were clear and universally intended, the transmission of meaning should not depend on specialized academic disciplines or contested methodologies (Swinburne, 1992). The fact that such disciplines exist—and are considered essential to biblical understanding—implies that interpretation compensates for the text’s lack of inherent clarity (Dennett, 2006; Armstrong, 2014).

II. Hermeneutics and Exegesis as Indicators of Interpretive Failure

Hermeneutics and exegesis are presented within Christian theology as necessary tools for uncovering the meaning of scripture. Theologians argue that understanding biblical texts requires attention to ancient languages, historical context, cultural symbolism, authorial intent, genre, and covenants (Thiselton, 2009; Vanhoozer, 1998). However, the very need for these disciplines undermines claims of divine clarity and universal accessibility (Ehrman, 2005; Swinburne, 1992).

If God intended scripture to be His direct and comprehensible communication to all humanity, the message would not require expert mediation to be understood (Packer, 1994; Erickson, 2013). The existence of entire academic subfields devoted to decoding biblical meaning suggests that scripture behaves like other historically contingent human texts—culturally embedded, linguistically dated, and open to interpretive disagreement.

Moreover, hermeneutics is not a unified discipline but a contested one. Interpretive frameworks such as literalism, dispensationalism, covenant theology, liberation theology, typology, and reader-response models demonstrate that even within Christianity, scholars cannot agree on how scripture should be understood (McGrath, 2017; Grenz & Olson, 1992). The necessity of defending interpretive method is itself evidence that scripture lacks self-evident clarity (Thiselton, 2009; Vanhoozer, 1998).

Attempts to justify hermeneutics as part of divine design create further contradiction. If divine communication intentionally required interpretation, then God knowingly produced a message inaccessible without training and debate (Plantinga, 2000). If interpretation is necessitated by the limits of human history and culture, then revelation was not structured to overcome those limits (Ehrman, 2005; Armstrong, 2014). Both possibilities conflict with the claim that an omnipotent being intended clear communication across all times and peoples.

III. Linguistic and Cultural Distance as Barriers to Revelation

Scripture was written in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Koine Greek—languages that the vast majority of people across history have never spoken or read (Fitzmyer, 1997; Silva, 1994; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980). Even among trained scholars, translation disputes persist over the meaning of key words and phrases (Ehrman, 2005; Metzger, 2001). Cultural and historical distance compounds the problem: metaphors, idioms, customs, and social norms embedded in ancient contexts do not map cleanly onto modern worldviews (Wright, 2018; Armstrong, 2014).

If divine revelation were meant to be universally understood, it would not depend on languages that have gone extinct or evolved beyond common. No contemporary Christian reads scripture in the original languages without training, yet translations introduce discrepancies, theological biases, and interpretive drift (Metzger & Ehrman, 2005).

Furthermore, cultural practices reflected in scripture—such as animal sacrifice, ritual impurity laws, slavery, polygamy, tribal warfare, and patriarchal norms—require interpretive justification for modern readers (McGrath, 2017; Armstrong, 2014). Apologists often argue that these elements were conditioned by their time, but this concession implies that scripture was not delivered in a universally intelligible or morally self-evident form (Ehrman, 2005).

As linguistic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein and later hermeneutic theorists have noted, meaning is inseparable from language use and form of life (Wittgenstein, 1953; Thiselton, 2009). A truly omniscient communicator aware of future cultural shifts could have provided revelation in a form that transcended linguistic and historical contingency. The absence of such universality suggests human, not divine, authorship (Dennett, 2006; Vanhoozer, 1998).

IV. The Logical Contradiction: Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Obscure Communication

The central theological claim of divine revelation rests on the assumption that God intended human beings to understand His message (Grudem, 1994; Frame, 2013). If God is omniscient, He would foresee interpretive confusion. If omnipotent, He could prevent it. If loving, He would desire clarity rather than ambiguity in matters of salvation and morality.

The observable reality of scriptural interpretation directly contradicts these claims. Scripture is fragmented, disputed, and interpreted through mutually incompatible frameworks (Ehrman, 2005; McGrath, 2017). Translation committees disagree on wording (Metzger & Ehrman, 2005). Denominations split over doctrine (Center for the Study of Global Christianity, 2019). Ethical teachings are selectively emphasized or discarded based on cultural shifts (Armstrong, 2014). Interpretation is affected by confirmation bias, indoctrination, and cognitive schema (Festinger, 1957; Nickerson, 1998).

This produces an epistemic dilemma:
• If God intended clarity and failed, His omnipotence is undermined.
• If God intended clarity but allowed confusion, His benevolence or competence is in question.
• If God did not intend universal clarity, revelation is not meant for all humanity.
• If scripture’s ambiguity is defended as intentional, the concept of revelation loses meaning (Dennett, 2006; Swinburne, 1992).

The claim that divine truth was revealed to humanity collapses under the weight of interpretive inconsistency. Hermeneutics becomes not a tool for clarifying divine revelation but a compensatory response to textual obscurity (Thiselton, 2009; Vanhoozer, 1998).

V. Cognitive Science and the Construction of Scriptural Meaning

Research in cognitive psychology demonstrates that perception and interpretation are not neutral processes but are shaped by prior beliefs, schemas, and cultural conditioning (Bartlett, 1932; Piaget, 1954; Nickerson, 1998). Perception is heavily influenced by top-down processing (Goldstein, 2019), schema activation (Bartlett, 1932; Piaget, 1954), and confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). These mechanisms influence not only how individuals interpret texts but what they notice, overlook, or reframe (Festinger, 1957; Kahneman, 2011).

When applied to scripture, these cognitive principles reveal that believers do not encounter the Bible as an objective message. Rather, they perceive it through conceptual filters shaped by upbringing, doctrine, community reinforcement, and personal identity (McGrath, 2017; Armstrong, 2014). Meaning is not extracted from the text—it is constructed through an interaction between text and worldview (Dennett, 2006; Wittgenstein, 1953).

For example, the same passage may be interpreted as literal history, symbolic metaphor, moral instruction, prophecy, or myth depending on the reader’s theological background (Ehrman, 2005; Wright, 2018). Cognitive dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957) further influences interpretation by encouraging reinterpretation rather than rejection of conflicting material. Thus, interpretive diversity is not merely a sociological phenomenon—it is the predictable outcome of cognitive processing (Nickerson, 1998; Bartlett, 1932).

If scripture required no interpretation, doctrinal disputes would be minimal The fact that meaning must be mediated through belief systems indicates that revelation does not operate independently of cognition.  A divinely intended universal message would need to bypass subjective filters or be immune to perceptual divergence. The observable dependence on cognitive schemas suggests revelation is indistinguishable from human meaning-making (Festinger, 1957; Piaget, 1954).

VI. Epistemic Lens Theory and Perceptual Divergence

Epistemic lens theory (Lay/Neo Israel, 2025) posits that individuals perceive and interpret reality through internalized belief systems that function as cognitive-perceptual filters. These lenses influence not only judgment and memory but perception itself (Goldstein, 2019; Kahneman, 2011). Religious worldviews, particularly those installed during early socialization, shape how individuals interpret scripture at a foundational level.

A Christian, for instance, may read passages involving violence, sacrifice, or divine judgment and perceive righteousness, justice, or holiness. A secular critical thinker may read the same passages and perceive cruelty, moral inconsistency, or mythological anthropology.  The divergence is not merely in opinion but in the perceptual framing generated by epistemic conditioning.

When applied to scriptural interpretation, epistemic lens theory explains why disagreements persist even among scholars trained in the same languages and texts.  Interpretation is not merely an exercise in translation—it is a reconstruction of meaning through cognitive filters (Piaget, 1954; Nickerson, 1998). Thus, hermeneutics is required not to uncover divine intent but to negotiate between conflicting lenses (Thiselton, 2009; Vanhoozer, 1998).

The necessity of epistemic mediation in understanding scripture undermines the theological claim that revelation functions as direct communication. A message that requires subjective reconstruction cannot be upheld as universal in either form or function.

VII. Denominational Fragmentation and Interpretive Pluralism

One of the most significant empirical challenges to the doctrine of clear divine revelation is the existence of thousands of Christian denominations, each claiming scriptural authority for mutually incompatible doctrines (Center for the Study of Global Christianity, 2019; Pew Research Center, 2011). Estimates place the number of distinct Christian denominations between 30,000 and 45,000 worldwide (Center for the Study of Global Christianity, 2019; Barrett, Kurian, & Johnson, 2001). These divisions are not limited to minor disagreements but encompass core theological claims including salvation, baptism, sacraments, predestination, soteriology, ecclesiology, and morality (McGrath, 2017; Armstrong, 2014).

If scripture functioned as a clear and universal revelation, interpretive consensus would be expected on foundational doctrines.  Instead, disagreement is so pronounced that separate traditions reject each other’s legitimacy (Ehrman, 2005; Dennett, 2006). Historical schisms—such as the Protestant Reformation, the East-West Schism, and intra-denominational splits—arose not from rejecting scripture but from interpreting it differently (McGrath, 2017; Wright, 2018).

Doctrinal pluralism demonstrates that revelation operates within sociocultural and historical contexts rather than transcending them.  The reliance on councils, creeds, confessions, and theological authorities to settle disputes further indicates that scripture alone does not convey a singular meaning (Metzger & Ehrman, 2005; Vanhoozer, 1998). Revelation, if present, is not self-interpreting.

Theological arguments that attribute disagreement to human sin or fallibility do not resolve the underlying inconsistency. An omnipotent and omniscient deity seeking to communicate clearly would not rely on texts so vulnerable to misinterpretation that doctrinal unity depends on institutional intervention (Plantinga, 2000; Swinburne, 1992). Interpretive pluralism is evidence of human authorship, not divine communication (Ehrman, 2005; Dennett, 2006).

VIII. Theological Counterarguments and Their Limitations

Christian theologians commonly defend the obscurity of scripture by appealing to free will, human fallenness, progressive revelation, cultural context, or the role of the Holy Spirit (Plantinga, 2000; Swinburne, 1992; Packer, 1994). While these responses attempt to reconcile interpretive complexity with divine intent, each introduces further logical or theological tension (Dennett, 2006; Armstrong, 2014).

1. “Human sin causes misinterpretation.”
   This argument asserts that scripture is clear, but human pride, rebellion, or spiritual blindness prevents understanding (Packer, 1994; Erickson, 2013). However, this shifts responsibility from divine communication to human deficiency, raising the question of why an omnipotent and omniscient God would choose a communicative method so vulnerable to misunderstanding. If correct interpretation is essential for salvation or obedience, then designing a text readable only by the morally or spiritually skilled undermines the universality of revelation (Swinburne, 1992; Plantinga, 2000).
2. “The Holy Spirit provides true interpretation.”
   This view claims that divine illumination resolves interpretive ambiguity (Packer, 1994; Horton, 2006). Yet, believers who claim guidance by the Holy Spirit routinely disagree on doctrine—even within the same denomination (Pew Research Center, 2011; Center for the Study of Global Christianity, 2019). If the Spirit were an effective interpreter, doctrinal convergence would be expected rather than fragmentation (Dennett, 2006; Ehrman, 2005). The claim is unfalsifiable and unsupported by empirical religious history.
3. “God accommodates human culture and language.”
   Some theologians argue that God must communicate through existing human languages and cultural contexts (Frame, 2013; Vanhoozer, 1998). Even if granted, this does not explain why revelation was not periodically clarified, updated, or universalized as cultures, languages, and epistemic frameworks evolved (Wright, 2018; Armstrong, 2014). An intelligent communicator would anticipate interpretive drift over time and compensate accordingly. Non-revelatory texts exhibit exactly the same limitations (Ehrman, 2005; Dennett, 2006).
4. “Mystery is intentional.”
   Some Christian traditions maintain that ambiguity protects divine sovereignty or invites faith (Plantinga, 2000; Swinburne, 1992). This response concedes rather than solves the problem: if revelation is partially concealed by design, then it cannot simultaneously function as a universally clear guide to truth (Dennett, 2006; Armstrong, 2014). Hiddenness is incompatible with the claim that God desires all people to know and follow His word unambiguously.
5. “Essential doctrines are clear despite disagreements.”
   This minimalist approach claims that while secondary doctrines are debated, the central message of salvation is plainly understood (Packer, 1994; Horton, 2006). However, soteriological disagreement among Christians—on atonement, faith versus works, predestination, baptism, obedience, repentance, and sacraments—directly contradicts this claim (Pew Research Center, 2011; McGrath, 2017). If the most crucial message is unclear, selective clarity elsewhere is insufficient (Ehrman, 2005; Dennett, 2006).

IX. Implications for Theology, Epistemology, and Religious Authority

If scripture behaves like a culturally embedded, linguistically mediated, interpretively unstable text, then claims of divine revelation must be reconsidered (Ehrman, 2005; Armstrong, 2014). The need for hermeneutics and exegesis is better explained as evidence of human textual authorship than as a component of divine communication (Dennett, 2006; Vanhoozer, 1998).

Several key implications follow:

1. Revelation becomes functionally indistinguishable from tradition.
   If meaning is constructed through interpretation, then scripture transmits not divine knowledge but culturally conditioned belief systems (McGrath, 2017; Armstrong, 2014).
2. Authority shifts from text to interpreter.
   Since texts do not speak independently, religious authority resides in those who define meaning—pastors, theologians, institutions, or communities (Wright, 2018; Grenz & Olson, 1992).
3. Epistemic relativism infiltrates doctrine.
   When interpretive frameworks differ, so do perceived truths. Revelation ceases to function as an epistemic foundation (Dennett, 2006; Plantinga, 2000).
4. Cognitive and cultural science better explain religious disagreement than theology does.
   Top-down processing, confirmation bias, perceptual framing, and sociocultural conditioning offer more coherent accounts of scriptural disagreement than appeals to divine intent (Festinger, 1957; Nickerson, 1998).
5. Universality is undermined.
   A revelation that requires academic reconstruction, linguistic expertise, or theological mediation cannot be rightly described as universally accessible (Metzger & Ehrman, 2005; Thiselton, 2009).

These implications suggest that treating scripture as divine revelation obscures the human mechanisms by which it is produced, preserved, and interpreted (Armstrong, 2014; Dennett, 2006).

X. Conclusion

The doctrine of divine revelation asserts that God intentionally communicated His will to humanity through inspired scripture (Grudem, 1994; Frame, 2013). Yet the observable characteristics of biblical interpretation—linguistic dependence, cultural embeddedness, doctrinal disagreement, and hermeneutical complexity—conflict with the idea of universal clarity or accessibility. The existence of hermeneutics and exegesis is not evidence of interpretive richness but of structural inadequacy.  A message requiring specialized training, contextual reconstruction, and theological arbitration cannot be considered a successful instance of omnipotent communication.

Cognitive science, philosophy of language, and epistemic lens theory provide coherent explanations for how scripture is perceived, interpreted, and debated (Bartlett, 1932; Piaget, 1954; Festinger, 1957). Rather than functioning as a direct transmission of divine knowledge, scripture operates like other historically situated human texts (Ehrman, 2005; Armstrong, 2014). Its meaning is not received but constructed through culturally inherited schemas, doctrinal presuppositions, and confirmation-based cognition (Nickerson, 1998; Goldstein, 2019). Theological defenses of revelation—appealing to spiritual blindness, divine mystery, or accommodative communication—do not resolve the underlying contradiction between divine intent and interpretive reality (Plantinga, 2000; Packer, 1994).

Ultimately, the necessity of hermeneutics reveals a deeper epistemological truth: revelation that must be interpreted is indistinguishable from tradition that must be justified (Dennett, 2006; Armstrong, 2014). If scripture reflected the will of an omnipotent, omniscient being seeking universal understanding, it would not require centuries of reconstruction, debate, and institutional mediation to be known (McGrath, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2011). The characteristics of biblical interpretation align more closely with human authorship than divine origin. Recognizing this opens new paths for philosophical inquiry, cognitive analysis, and critical engagement with religious epistemology (Ehrman, 2005; Wright, 2018).

References

Armstrong, K. (2014). The case for God. Anchor Books.

Barrett, D. B., Kurian, G. T., & Johnson, T. M. (2001). World Christian encyclopedia: A comparative survey of churches and religions in the modern world. Oxford University Press.

Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge University Press.

Center for the Study of Global Christianity. (2019). Christianity in its global context, 1970–2020. Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary.

Dennett, D. C. (2006). Breaking the spell: Religion as a natural phenomenon. Viking.

Ehrman, B. D. (2005). Misquoting Jesus: The story behind who changed the Bible and why. HarperOne.

Erickson, M. J. (2013). Christian theology (3rd ed.). Baker Academic.

Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press.

Fitzmyer, J. A. (1997). The Semitic background of the New Testament. Wipf and Stock.

Frame, J. M. (2013). Systematic theology: An introduction to Christian belief. P&R Publishing.

Goldstein, E. B. (2019). Cognitive psychology: Connecting mind, research, and everyday experience (5th ed.). Cengage Learning.

Grenz, S. J., & Olson, R. E. (1992). 20th-century theology: God and the world in a transitional age. InterVarsity Press.

Grudem, W. (1994). Systematic theology: An introduction to biblical doctrine. Zondervan.

Harris, R. L., Archer, G. L., & Waltke, B. K. (1980). Theological wordbook of the Old Testament. Moody Press.

Horton, D. R. (Ed.). (2006). The portable seminary. Bethany House.

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

McGrath, A. E. (2017). Christian theology: An introduction (6th ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.

Metzger, B. M. (2001). The Bible in translation: Ancient and English versions. Baker Academic.

Metzger, B. M., & Ehrman, B. D. (2005). The text of the New Testament: Its transmission, corruption, and restoration (4th ed.). Oxford University Press.

Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175–220. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175